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Abstract
Public news can be expected to change market prices but, unlike “public information,”
there are differing expectations about the full impact and hence trading is necessary for the
market to process these divergent views.

A good illustration of this is a surprise

announcement of an increase in German interest rates coupled with remarkably detailed
concurrent transactions data from an electronic market. After initial trades hollowed out
the market, a large volume of seller-initiated trades removed most of the existing demand,
without many of the prior bids being withdrawn. While this is contrary to a rationalexpectations view of public information, it is consistent with dealers’ practice, as an
exercise in self-discipline, to book targeted profits if possible in the face of uncertainty.
Evidence also shows that the speculative activity by traders in reaction to the news
destabilized the market for the next two hours.
JEL classification: F30; G14; G15
Keywords: Exchange rate; Public news; Public information; Electronic interdealer market;
Order flows
_________________________________________________________________________
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1. Public news and a notable price change
On Wednesday, October 8, 1997, Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S. Federal
Reserve, testified before the House Budget Committee. He said labor trends suggest that
the U.S. economy is on an unsustainable track … continued rapid stock market gains are
unrealistic, that inflation is likely to rise unless demand slows markedly and that
productivity gains are unlikely to be enough to curb price pressures. These remarks
suggested that the Fed might take a more active role in trying to temper stock market gains,
possibly through higher U.S. interest rates, with a potential appreciation of the dollar.
The next day, Thursday, October 9, the Bundesbank had a council meeting to
review its policy positions. Based on the fact that German unemployment remained at a
high level of 11.2% in September and there was no major inflation threat at the time, the
market consensus was for no immediate interest rate hike. Various presses repeatedly
reported that the majority of traders expected no changes in interest rates that day, thinking
it more likely to occur in a few weeks.
These expectations about the timing proved wrong. An 11:50 Greenwich Mean
Time (GMT) AP-Dow Jones News reported: “At 1130 GMT, the Bundesbank announced
that it had fixed the rate for its securities repurchase agreements at 3.30% for the next two
weeks, up from 3.00%. The German central bank said that the move had been aimed at
preempting higher inflation, and will help damp growth in the M3 money supply
aggregate. The dollar fell sharply following the Bundesbank announcement, hitting an
intraday low of DM1.7428 just three minutes later, but by 1140 GMT had bounced to
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DM1.7450.”

This Bundesbank rate hike initiated an end to the five-year decline in

European rates.1
For this particular Bundesbank interest-rate announcement, traders were not only
surprised by the decision of an interest rate hike, but also by the unusual release time of
11:30 GMT. Hardy (1998) documents that the Bundesbank Council reviews its interest
rates every other Thursday and decisions are announced later that afternoon or early the
next morning. The press center of the Bundesbank confirms this claim and says that the
most frequent timing for announcements is 3:00 in the afternoon (which would be 14:00
GMT). When the Bundesbank made its interest rate announcement on Oct. 9th 1997, the
array of open orders appeared to be fairly normal. Thus, the unusual timing of unexpected
news provides an opportunity to study precisely how traders react to a surprise
announcement.
As is well known, in principle a price response to new public information can take
place without any trades. According to Fleming and Remolona (1999, p. 1901), “Theory
(e.g., French and Roll (1986)) identifies public information as that which affects prices
before anyone can trade on it.” In a foreign exchange market, this might happen when
dealer quotes are only indicative and actual deals are struck over the telephone. If all
dealers agree on a new market value after a public announcement, all prior quotes become
obsolete.

New quotes appear and trading can continue as usual around a markedly

changed market price, without order flow during the change. This concept constitutes a
standard simplification in the analysis of market microstructure that public information

1

The English version of the press release is reproduced in an appendix along with a description of how the

Bundesbank conveys its news to the public.
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does not affect the impact of concurrent order flows (see Hasbrouck (1991) as an
example). Andersen, et al. (2003, p. 59) write that it will be of interest “to determine
whether news affects exchange rates via order flow or instantaneously.”
We will use the term public news for a situation in which there is uncertainty about
the market impact of new information made available to all market participants at the same
time. While we believe that the full impact of unexpected news will rarely be immediately
assessed in the same way by all market participants, this terminology will avoid any
potential confusion with the French and Roll concept of public information. When there is
uncertainty about how much market price will change as the result of news, there will also
be differing expectations. Trading then enables the market to sort out the net effect of the
news.
The idea of divergent mappings from information to prices is discussed by Lyons
(2001, p. 21) as one reason why order flow conveys information to the market and
therefore tends to move price. He also quotes Isard (1995, pp. 182-3) who states that in
view of “economist’s very limited information about the relationship between equilibrium
exchange rates and macroeconomic fundamentals, … it is hardly conceivable that rational
market participants with complete information about macroeconomic fundamentals could
use that information to form precise expectations about the future market-clearing level of
exchange rates.” Isard’s words aptly describe the situation that applies when we refer to an
announcement of a change in fundamentals as public news.
In an electronic market, quotes are firm. If bids or offers are not canceled prior to
or during a public announcement, transactions can occur as the price adjusts in reaction to
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new information. In the case of the surprise announcement by the Bundesbank on October
9, 1997, a huge volume of trading did occur in the minute of the announcement.
A notable change in behavior occurred at about 11:30:35, or 35 seconds after the
announcement reportedly began.

The transaction price of the dollar actually rose

somewhat during the first 35 seconds and reached 1.7560 DM. Shortly after 11:30:35,
however, the price of the dollar started to drop. At 11:30:59.03, there is a trade at 1.7450
DM. That is a drop of over 0.6 percent in 25 seconds. [ln(1.756) – ln(1.745) = 0.006284.]
To place the drop in perspective, consider what Dominguez (2003) found when she
examined 5-minute returns in the DM/$ rate from 1989 to 1995. A return of 0.006284
would have been the ninth largest in that six-year period.
In this paper, we provide a detailed examination of data from an electronic market
to study market reactions to this public news. Fig. 1 shows transactions prices for the
DM/$ on the day of the announcement. The dashed line represents cumulative order flow.
In the absence of public news, order flow, to be discussed in more detail below, generally
drives prices in interdealer markets, such as the one depicted here. An upward move in
price is associated with more buyer than seller initiated trades and a downward move with
the opposite. Evans and Lyons (2002) have shown the strong short-term impact of order
flow on exchange rates. In the case of the Bundesbank announcement, order flow turns out
to play an extremely important role.
There is a literature examining the link between the arrival of news and market
activity, measured by trading volume and price volatility. Berry and Howe (1994) and
Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) are such studies with a focus on a stock market, while
Melvin and Yin (2000) deal with a foreign exchange market.
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We complement this

literature by an analysis of market activity in an electronic foreign exchange market as the
result of a speculative activity by traders in response to a surprise macro announcement.
In what follows, section 2 describes some remarkably detailed data and the nature
of an electronic interdealer market. There are two distinct phases of trading activity in the
first minute after 11:30. The first phase, lasting about 35 seconds and described in section
3, is a flurry of trades and a hollowing out of the market, a strong indication of uncertainty
about the pending announcement.
The second phase, discussed in section 4, is a large drop in the dollar as sellers
rapidly hit existing demand. What is surprising here is how little of the demand was
withdrawn during this period.
The speculative trading that took place during that first minute set in motion
subsequent dynamics, which are discussed in Section 5. In the second minute after the
announcement, something occurs that is quite contrary to the idea that price adjusts
without trades or order flow when there is new public information. In this case, order flow
was strongly negative throughout the second minute and yet price changed very little. We
offer an explanation that is consistent with the uncertainties generated by public news and
the prior speculative trading. Section 5 also reports evidence that it took about two hours
before the market again settled into more normal patterns. Section 6 concludes.

2. An electronic interdealer FX market
The interdealer market data we will analyze come from what is known as the
D2000-2 electronic market, maintained by Reuters. The data for the week of October 6 –
10, 1997, for trading of the DM/$ were obtained from Reuters by the Financial Markets
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Group at the London School of Economics. See Goodhart, et al. (1996), and Danielsson
and Payne (2002) for additional details about the D2000-2 data.
At any time, a participating dealer can enter:
A bid, a limit order to buy at a specified price or lower,
An ask, a limit order to sell at a specified price or higher,
A hit, a market sell order at the best available bid price, or
A take, a market buy order at the best available ask price.
The dealer can also withdraw or cancel an unfilled bid or ask. The system records actual
transactions and keeps track of all the existing orders that have not been filled. The screen
that the dealers see shows only the highest bid, the lowest ask, the quantities available at
these best bid and ask prices, and the price of the most recent transaction. The data show
to the nearest 0.01 of a second the times when a transaction enters the market and when it
is removed or withdrawn.
An interdealer FX market provides a link between diverse buyers and sellers of
foreign exchange. For ease in exposition we will often refer to a bank’s dealing room as
the bank and, while several people may be involved, we will occasionally refer to a single
trader carrying out different transactions and representing the fiduciary interests of the
bank.

See Lyons (2001) for a detailed discussion of the microstructure approach to

exchange rates.
Portfolio shifts and changing needs for different currencies by banks’ customers are
an ongoing process. Customers may deal regularly with one bank or may check with
several banks for the best prices before placing an order. A bank will typically quote both
bid and ask prices in response to a query and the caller may or may not choose to buy
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foreign currency at the bank’s ask price or sell at the bank’s bid price. These quotes will
change over time in response to market changes and may be different for different types of
customers. There are now electronic broking systems for these customer markets that did
not exist in 1997.
For illustrative purposes, suppose the bank offers to sell dollars at 1.7520 DM/$
and to buy at 1.7510 DM/$. Consider what might happen if a customer decides to buy 2
million dollars with DM at a price of 1.7520. This is an example of what is known as
private information in the literature. In this case, the bank is now long in DM and short in
dollars and needs to decide what to do. A trader for the bank can put in a market take
order in the interdealer market to buy dollars right away. Or the trader can speculate by
putting in a limit bid order to buy dollars at a price below the current best offer price in the
market.
A decision to cover the bank’s position and buy dollars immediately in the
interdealer market is profitable for the bank because the “touch” or “inside spread”, the
difference between the lowest offer price and the highest bid price, is typically smaller than
the spread in the customer market. Suppose, for example, that the best offer price is
1.7516 and the best bid price is 1.7514. If the bank buys 2 million dollars at 1.7516, there
is an immediate profit of 800 DM ($2,000,000 times 0.0004 DM/$).
As evident in Fig. 1, the market price jumps around. If instead of immediately
covering the bank’s short position in dollars, the bank’s trader puts in a bid price to buy 2
million dollars at a price below 1.7516, say 1.7514, and waits for another dealer to agree to
sell 2 million at the limit price, this is a speculative position. The market may hit the price
and the profit is 1,200 DM. However, there may be a subsequent run of buyer-initiated
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trades, and the trading prices may start to rise. In setting a limit order, the trader has to
weigh the tradeoff between the expected gain from waiting and the greater uncertainty
about the eventual price at which the bank’s position is covered. 2
Our example of a bank receiving an order from a customer to purchase 2 million
dollars is, as noted above, private information. If the bank immediately covers the position
in the interdealer market by making a purchase of dollars, this is known as a positive order
flow and in effect transmits to the market the bank’s private information. An order flow is
a signed transaction in the interdealer market. If a buyer initiates a trade, the order flow is
positive. If a seller initiates a trade, the order flow is negative. Over a period of time, the
net order flow is the difference between the quantity of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated
trades in the interdealer market.
Since all transactions in this interdealer market are in millions of dollars, in later
discussion we will refer to the transactions in units, where it is understood that one unit is
one million dollars.

3. The market while the announcement is pending
At any time in the interdealer market, there is an array of limit orders to buy and an
array of limit orders to sell. We will refer to unfilled buy orders as demand in the
interdealer market and to unfilled sell orders as supply. Fig. 2 depicts the situation at
11:30 am on Thursday, October 9, 1997. At precisely 11:30 am the highest buy order was
at 1.7530 DM for 5 units. The relatively flat demand schedule depicted in Fig. 2 is the

2

Costs and benefits of placing orders rather than dealing immediately are discussed in Handa and Schwartz

(1996), Foucault (1999), and Hollifield et al. (2002), inter alia.
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cumulative array of limit buy orders unfilled as of 11:30. These consist of the 5 units at
1.7530, 1 unit at 1.7523, 2 units at 1.7522, 2 units at 1.7521, and on down. The supply
schedule is the cumulative array of limit sell orders: 5 units at 1.7535, 1 unit at 1.7538, 2
units at 1.7539, 3 units at 1.7542 and on up. The degree of liquidity in the market is
reflected in both the inside spread and the flatness of the curves. For the picture shown,
the inside spread is 0.0005, and the spread at 10 units is 0.0021 (=1.7542-1.7521). These
spreads were somewhat more than was typical for this market during active hours, but not
unusually so. (See Danielsson and Payne (2002) for a distribution of inside spreads during
the week and footnote 4 below.) The picture is one of fairly strong buying support for the
dollar at this time.
When the announcement by the Bundesbank reportedly began at 11:30, there are no
trades for the next 13 seconds and 6 units of sell offers are withdrawn. The absence of
trades suggests that dealers temporarily stopped trading to note that an announcement was
pending.
Over the next 22 seconds, from 11:30:13 to 11:30:35, there is a large volume of
activity. About 87 units are traded. These are both supply initiated and demand initiated,
and the price trend is generally up during these 22 seconds, rising from 1.7530 to 1.7560.
The fact that the transactions prices rose indicates that many traders did not yet expect that
the news would precipitate a fall in the dollar.
Fig. 2 shows considerably more demand than supply at 11:30:00. We interpret this
as indicative of a greater volume of open short positions in dollars than open long positions
in the interdealer market. The increase in the price of the dollar during those 35 seconds
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undoubtedly represents more short covering by buyer-initiated trades at the best offer
prices than long covering by seller-initiated trades at the best bid prices during this period.
As a result of this activity, there is a substantial hollowing out of the market from
11:30:00 to 11:30:35. This can be seen by comparing Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. By 11:30:35, the
inside spread grew to 0.0039 and the spread at 10 units to 0.0052. These are very large for
this market. Some dealers evidently covered speculative positions and were waiting to see
how to interpret the news.

4. A dramatic shift in trading activity
The full impact of the announcement hits the market at about 11:30:35. As seen by
comparing Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, there is a dramatic shrinkage of the demand curve between
11:30:35 and 11:31:00. Beginning at 11:30:37 until 11:30:59, sellers rapidly hit buy orders
along the demand curve, mostly by crossed limit orders rather than by market orders.3
During that time, the price falls to 1.7450. 86 units along the demand curve that existed at
11:30:35 are removed. Remarkably, only 5 of these units were removed by bidders
withdrawing their bids. All the rest were seller-initiated trades.
During these 25 seconds, there is also considerable activity by sellers testing the
market. If an offer does not immediately result in a transaction, many of these offers are
withdrawn within a few seconds. A comparison of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 shows a few new

3

A market sell order trades at the best available bid price. In a rapidly changing market, there is uncertainty

about what the transaction price may be. A limit order to sell below existing bid prices will transact at any
bid prices above the limit order, up to the quantity specified, but assures that the selling price will not be
below the limit price.
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offers that entered between 11:30:35 and 11:31 are still on the supply side of the market.
All of the unfilled offers as of 11:30:35 are eventually withdrawn without any sale.
In this electronic market, because buy orders were not withdrawn quickly, negative
order flow drove the price lower.

By 11:30:35, many dealers, contrary to prior

expectations, expected the DM price of the dollar to fall. If that had been fully anticipated,
there would not have been such a high and flat demand curve at that time.
An interesting question is why more of the demand was not immediately
withdrawn after 11:30:35. To address this question, we need to distinguish limit orders by
whether or not they represent speculative cover for open positions. Some dealers may, at
that moment, be market makers without a long or short position. Their limit orders have
been entered in hopes of making profits by eventual transactions on both sides of their
spread. When new information arrives suggesting that the market price will fall, their bids
should be immediately withdrawn and new bids entered at a lower price, although these
dealers may wait to see where the market stabilizes before entering new bids. There is less
urgency about immediately replacing their ask prices in this situation. The fact that so few
units of demand were withdrawn as the price fell suggests that there were very few market
makers without open positions among the higher bid prices at 11:30:35.
From this we infer that most of the bids at the top of the demand curve were put in
by dealers with short positions in dollars. Their bid prices, if executed, would yield a
profit to the bank. The question then is why these dealers did not withdraw their bids,
which were based on prior information, and put in new lower ones to reap extra expected
profits. Since these bids represent speculative cover of open positions that are the result of
prior sales of dollars, the fall in the price of the dollar is good news for these traders whose
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bids can shortly be executed if not withdrawn. If they get greedy, withdraw their existing
bids, and try to buy later at a lower price, they may miss a turning point and not realize the
profit at all. As an exercise in self-discipline, which is essential for success, dealers let
targeted profitable bids be hit. Conversations with dealers indicate that this is a common
practice, and in a practitioner’s guide for currency traders, Henderson (2002, p. 189)
stresses: “Trading discipline is at least as important as having the right view.”
For reasons of confidentiality, individual dealers are not identified in the data set,
so we cannot tell if dealers whose prior bids were hit also tried to make sales to other
bidders. There is no reason why they cannot join the crowd and make speculative sales if
they think additional expected profits are possible.
These considerations raise another point. While order flow drives the market price
given the existing limit orders, the source of the order flow can make a difference. Dealerdriven order flow can have implications for subsequent market behavior that differ from
customer-driven order flow. When a seller-initiated transaction in the interdealer market
covers a bank’s prior sale to a customer, the bank’s position has been squared and there is
no subsequent potential trading because of that transaction. By dealer-driven order flow,
we mean speculative open positions taken by dealers. At some point those dealers will
need to cover their positions and that can induce further uncertainty and volatility in the
market. Thus, we expect subsequent effects well after the Bundesbank announcement.

5. Time to settle down
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To begin an examination of the subsequent dynamics, we take a closer look at the
patterns of order flow and price changes during the two minutes after 11:30. Fig. 5 shows
cumulative order flow and transaction prices from 11:30 to 11:32.4
As can be seen in Fig. 5, the pattern during the first minute is definitely one of
order flow driving price. The relatively big drop in price right after 11:30:35 was a bounce
from a prior buyer-initiated trade along the existing supply schedule to a seller-initiated
trade along the then much lower demand schedule.
At first glance, the second minute looks anomalous. Order flow continued to be
strongly negative but this did not drive price lower. There were trades at a price of 1.7450
DM/$ at 11:31:01.06 and again a minute later at 11:32:01.60. In between, price bounced
up occasionally but never very far above 1.7450. The negative flow is generated by the
fact that dealers were putting in new buy orders that were almost immediately hit by sellerinitiated trades. It is likely that these new buy orders were by dealers who had made
speculative sales during the price decline in the first minute. It looked as if a temporary
floor had been found, so they were booking their profit from the prior speculative sales.
The fact that there were also willing sellers at this price level reflects still divergent
views about when the price will stop falling.

The evidence suggests the following

scenario. Some customers, who continuously monitor the market, decide to sell dollars.
This will give rise to customer-driven order flow in the interdealer market. The banks
receiving these orders have private information about selling pressure that they believe will
drive price still lower in the interdealer market. The dealers in these banks therefore want
4

This differs from Fig. 1 in two ways. First, Fig. 5 shows tick-by-tick data while Fig. 1 is accumulated over

5 second intervals and the price is the last transaction price during the interval. Second, in Fig. 5 order flow is
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to cover their long positions immediately by selling dollars in the interdealer market.
Some may also take speculative short positions. Thus, the decline in price in the first
minute could have been in anticipation of customer-driven order flow that would follow in
the second minute or later. For price to decline further then depends on ensuing decisions
by customers to sell dollars.
For the next two hours, with lots of bounces, the trend in price is down and order
flow is negative.

Over time, as dealers try to square their positions, their purely

speculative order flows should tend to cancel each other. Therefore, a negative net order
flow over a period as long as two hours is very likely generated by outside customer sell
orders. In that case, the picture in Fig. 1 indicates that somewhat delayed portfolio shifts
out of dollars and into DMs drove the price of the dollar down.
This downward pressure on the dollar then drew central banks into the market.
According to an AFX news wire at 14:03 GMT: “A number of European central banks,
among them the Bundesbank, are reported by dealers to have been intervening in the
currency market in an effort to cap the strength of the mark following the decisions to raise
German and other core European interest rates, dealers said. They said that central banks
have been buying dollar/mark just below the 1.7400 level.”
In Fig. 1, the downward trend in the price of the dollar is reversed by about 13:30.
In addition to central bank demands for dollars, outside sellers of dollars are probably
buying them back. By the end of the day, the dollar has recovered to its level reached
shortly after the announcement.

weighted by the size of a transaction, and in Fig. 1 order flow is unweighted.
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Evidence indicates that it took about two hours for trading volume and price
volatility to settle down to normal in this market. Table 1 records mean trading volumes
per minute in 10 minute intervals from 11:00 to 14:00 on Thursday and on Monday,
Tuesday and Wednesday, as well as p-values for the hypotheses of equal means. Between
11:10 and 11:30 on Thursday, volume was slightly less than on the prior three days but not
significantly so. As we detailed above, volume rose dramatically during and immediately
after the announcement on Thursday, and significantly so compared with Monday through
Wednesday. Volume remained relatively high on Thursday until about 13:20.
For eight different hours of the day, Monday through Thursday from 7:30 to 15:30
GMT, for a total of 1920 minutes, average trading volume was 19.7 million dollars per
minute with a standard deviation of 17.7. The high standard deviation relative to the mean
reflects a few large outliers and a strong positive skewness of 2.5. In those 1920 minutes,
over half of the minutes with the largest 1 percent of total volume occurred on Thursday
within two hours after the announcement.
A similar story about the continuing effects of the surprise announcement can be
seen in data on price volatility, shown in Table 2. Price volatility is measured by the
average absolute values of the log change in end-of-minute prices. Thursday’s volatility
jumps to exceed an average level of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday substantially for the
30 minutes following the announcement and remains relatively high until at least 13:40.
Of the 19 highest absolute values of log price changes on those four days, 14 or them
occurred within two hours after the announcement on Thursday and 11 of them within the
first half hour. The story is much the same in terms of within minute price volatility.
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One other way of assessing market reactions to the news is to examine the spreads
between the supply and demand curves, such as those depicted in Fig. 2 through Fig. 4.
Table 3 shows the inside spread and spreads at 10 and 40 units at various times on
Thursday. While the inside spread remains fairly narrow after 11:40, there is an occasional
widening at higher numbers of units. By 13:10 a fairly normal depth to the market appears
to have been reestablished, although the spreads are still somewhat higher than for
comparable times on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. 5 A figure for demand and supply
curves at 13:20, is very much like the one at 11:30 shown by Fig. 2, albeit at lower prices.

6. Concluding remarks
An announcement of an interest-rate increase by the Bundesbank beginning at
11:30 Thursday, October 9, 1997, is a good example of public news, in which uncertainty
about the impact results in substantial trading. It contains news that had evidently not been
anticipated at that time and therefore, together with a concurrent record of transactions in
an electronic DM/$ market, provides an opportunity to analyze in detail dynamic market
responses to news. Portfolio balance models predict that this should cause an immediate
appreciation of the DM, as portfolio managers try to switch from dollar to DM assets, but
no one knows for sure how much appreciation will occur.
The first to react to such public news will be the traders in the interdealer market.
If existing price quotes are all indicative and if there is a consensus on what the new price
5

For example, a sampling of spreads between 13:00 and 14:00 on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday yields

are average inside spread of 2.0, an average spread at 10 units of 7.4 and an average spread at 40 units of
41.4.
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should be, then the DM/$ price can in principle drop immediately without any trading (the
French and Roll (1986) view of public information) .
By contrast, in the case of the Bundesbank’s interest-rate announcement, the initial
reaction is an extremely high volume of trading, both supply and demand initiated, and an
increasing spread as some traders presumably cover speculative positions. After 11:30:35,
there begins a huge volume of seller initiated trades (negative order flow) along much of
the existing demand schedule.
When most market participants believe that the price of the dollar is about to drop,
there is obviously no immediate need to cancel high sell orders. However, dealers who are
long in dollars will have an urgency to sell quickly or risk losses on their positions. Hence
they rush in to sell at existing bid prices.
The news that the dollar will drop is good news for dealers who are short in dollars
and have open bids to buy dollars. Their choice is either (1) to withdraw their bids and
wait until the price does drop or (2) to let the market hit their bids, book their profits, and
perhaps speculate with sell orders of their own. The fact in this instance that very few bids
were withdrawn indicates that dealers with short positions in dollars overwhelmingly chose
the second option. This is consistent with a practice by dealers, as an exercise in self
discipline, to book profits targeted by the original bids in the face of continuing uncertainty
about price changes.
These considerations lead us to hypothesize that, in a reverse situation in which
public news suddenly calls for the appreciation of the currency being traded, offers in an
electronic market will be taken more quickly by eager buyers than existing sell orders will
be withdrawn.
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We also attribute the continued high volume and price volatility of the DM/$ after
11:31 on Thursday, October 9, 1997, to the speculative activity just prior to 11:31. Except
for those who were covering long positions in the dollar, dealers who sold as the price was
dropping now have short positions. They represent a base of support as dealers try to
decide when to square their positions. As dealers adjust positions, waves of trades and
price bounces can readily follow.
From evidence in the D2000-2 data, it took about two hours after the
announcement before the market settled down from the dealer generated speculative
activity. Some of the extra volume after 11:31 can be the result of outside desired portfolio
shifts and central bank interventions, but the extra price volatility is very likely generated
by dealer speculation.
One last point to emphasize is that in a real-time electronic market, everyone does
not react at once to news. First movers can influence the subsequent dynamics. In the case
of the German interest rate announcement in October 1997, speculative selling hit existing
demand in the interdealer market faster than demand was withdrawn and well before
outside portfolio shifts could be implemented.
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Appendix: The Bundesbank press release of Oct. 9th, 1997
The Bundesbank holds a press conference and gives out press-releases in both
German and English versions after each meeting of the Central Bank Council.

The

Bundesbank does not broadcast its announcement but radio, TV, and news-wire reporters
are invited to attend the press conference. News agencies would immediately convey the
official announcement to their stations and the news is then transmitted to the dealing
room. The English version of the press release reads as follows:
“At its meeting today, the Central Bank Council of the Deutsche Bundesbank
decided to raise the fixed rate of interest for its securities repurchase agreements (repos) on
October 15 and 22, 1997 from hitherto 3.00% to 3.30%.
“The Central Bank Council gave the following explanation for the move:
“The Bundesbank has been pursuing an expansionary monetary policy for a
considerable time now. On balance, the central bank interest rates have been at historically
low levels since the interest rate cuts in April and August 1996. Money balances grew
sharply in 1996 and at the beginning of 1997. Owing to the weakening of the external
value of the Deutsche Mark so far this year, monetary conditions have eased further.
“A concurrent shift has occurred in the monetary policy setting. The price climate
changed during the summer months. Import prices, producer prices and consumer prices
have all risen. This was due in large part to exchange rate movements against the US
dollar and to increases in administered prices.
“To date, falling unit labour costs have acted as counterweight to “imported” and
administered price stimuli. Hence there is no cause to dramatise the current price trend.
The risks to price stability have increased, however. Timely countermeasures improve the
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prospects of steadying the growth process and prevent the build-up of an inflation potential
in the run-up to European monetary union.
“In keeping with its statutory mandate and within the framework of its monetary
policy options, the Bundesbank must endevour to ensure, above all, that the provision of
liquidity to the economy offers no leeway for an acceleration in the upward trust of prices.
In order to safeguard this for the future, a further deceleration of monetary growth is called
for – as the Central Bank Council pointed out already in July in its review of the monetary
target. This slight tightening of monetary policy associated with the raising of the repo
rate is intended to serve that purpose.”
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Fig. 1. The price of DM/US$ and cumulative order flows for Thursday of Oct. 9th, 1997
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Table 1
Average per-minute trading volumes: Thursday vs. Monday, Tuesday and Wednesdaya
Interval
11:00-11:10 11:10-11:20 11:20-11:30 11:30-11:40 11:40-11:50 11:50-12:00
Thur.
Mon.-Wed.
Difference
[p-value]
Interval

19.750
13.250
12.050
82.350
67.300
40.300
17.167
15.667
18.267
16.750
17.933
15.967
2.583
-2.417
-6.217
65.600***
49.367***
24.333***
[0.685]
[0.458]
[0.115]
[0.001]
[0.001]
[0.002]
12:00-12:10 12:10-12:20 12:20-12:30 12:30-12:40 12:40-12:50 12:50-13:00

Thur.
Mon.-Wed.
Difference
[p-value]
Interval

24.750
38.350
48.400
35.200
28.150
17.500
11.550
16.967
34.433
18.050
27.967
21.733
13.200***
21.383**
13.967*
17.150**
0.183
-4.233
[0.001]
[0.013]
[0.085]
[0.023]
[0.971]
[0.280]
13:00-13:10 13:10-13:20 13:20-13:30 13:30-13:40 13:40-13:50 13:50-14:00

Thur.
44.950
55.100
25.050
21.050
19.700
24.750
Mon.-Wed.
28.583
28.717
23.367
22.533
22.117
23.700
Difference
16.367
26.383***
1.683
-1.483
-2.417
1.050
[p-value]
[0.359]
[0.001]
[0.623]
[0.726]
[0.505]
[0.840]
a
Unequal variances are assumed when testing the hypotheses of equal means. Also, *, **, and ***
denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively.
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Table 2
Last trade price volatility comparisons: Thursday vs. average of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesdaya
Interval
11:00-11:10 11:10-11:20 11:20-11:30 11:30-11:40 11:40-11:50 11:50-12:00
Thur.
Mon.-Wed.
Difference
[p-value]
Interval

1.264
0.677
0.587
[0.220]
12:00-12:10

0.916
1.239
4.650
3.042
2.096
0.470
0.801
0.726
0.643
0.586
0.446**
0.438
3.924*
2.399***
1.510**
[0.026]
[0.191]
[0.052]
[0.004]
[0.019]
12:10-12:20 12:20-12:30 12:30-12:40 12:40-12:50 12:50-13:00

Thur.
Mon.-Wed.
Difference
[p-value]
Interval

0.873
0.454
0.419
[0.226]
13:00-13:10

0.897
1.321
0.848
1.471
1.497
0.627
0.636
0.479
0.578
0.429
0.270
0.685
0.369**
0.894***
1.067**
[0.393]
[0.065]
[0.046]
[0.006]
[0.048]
13:10-13:20 13:20-13:30 13:30-13:40 13:40-13:50 13:50-14:00

Thur.
1.573
1.652
1.001
1.227
0.826
0.850
Mon.-Wed.
1.014
0.569
0.560
0.634
0.552
0.577
Difference
0.560
1.083**
0.441**
0.592*
0.274
0.274
[p-value]
[0.454]
[0.027]
[0.020]
[0.061]
[0.208]
[0.293]
a
Unequal variances are assumed when testing the hypotheses of equal means. Also, *, **, and ***
denote 10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively.
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Table 3
Spreads between supply and demand curves on Thursdaya
Time

11:29

11:30

11:31:35

11:31

11:35

11:40

11:45

Inside Spread
Spread at 10 units
Spread at 40 units
Time

3
18
64
11:50

5
21
60
12:00

39
52
132
12:10

15
62
405
12:20

4
4
none
12:30

1
10
179
12:40

3
40
none
12:50

Inside Spread
Spread at 10 units
Spread at 40 units
Time

3
14
70
13:00

2
23
80
13:10

1
10
26
13:20

3
6
50
13:30

3
11
75
13:40

1
9
72
13:50

1
4
45
14:00

2
9
58

2
11
55

4
21
75

2
10
60

Inside Spread
3
3
2
Spread at 10 units
22
6
15
Spread at 40 units
75
25
60
a
Spreads are shown as 1000 times the actual spreads.
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